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IV 
SUMMARY  
 
The chasm in the protection of classified information in South African government 
indicates that all the departments have at their disposal information that is to some 
extent sensitive in nature and obviously requires security measures.  This study shows 
that government officials who in their official duties come to contact with classified 
information are either vulnerable or are implementing the security controls incorrectly.  
It is also clear that in the absence of a comprehensive statutory framework, the 
government departments’ classified information has resulted in an unstable and 
inconsistent classification and declassification environment.  The statutory framework 
would, in addition to other things, address the rising threat of espionage and 
antagonistic activities, the selling of information and the protection of critical records 
in government, without hindering the constitutional rights of citizens to access 
information.  This would create a system of valuable informantion and clarify which 
information requires security measures with respect to the protection of classified 
information. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
V 
KAKARETSO 
 
Kgaohanao e tshireletsong ya tlhahisoleseding e sireleditsweng ke mmuso wa Afrika 
Borwa e supa hore mafapha ohle a ona a na le tlhahisoleseding eo, ka ho hong, e 
leng ya sephiri mme e hloka maemo a tshireletso. Boithuto bona bo bontsha hore 
bahlanka ba mmuso bao, tshebetsong ya bona ya semmuso, ba teanang le 
tlhahisoleseding ya sephiri, ba kotsing hobane ba sebedisa ditaelo tsa polokeho ka 
mokgwa o fosahetseng. Ho boetse ho hlakile hore, bosikong ba moralo o 
phethahetseng wa semolao, disistimi tse sa sebetseng hantle tsa mafapa a mmuso 
tsa tlhahisoleseding ya sephiri di bakile tikoloho e sa tsitsang hape e sa hlophiswang 
ya tlhophiso le tloso ya tlhophiso ya tlhahisoleseding. Moralo wa semolao, hara tse 
ding, o ka sebetsana le phephetso e eketsehang ya bohlwela le diketsahalo tse ding 
tse belaetsang tse jwalo ka thekiso ya tlhahisoleseding, mme o sireletse direkote tsa 
mmuso tsa bohlokwa ntle le ho hatakela tokelo ya Molaotheo ya baahi ya phihlello ho 
tlhahisoleseding. Hona ho ka theha sistimi ya tlhahisoleseding ya bohlokwa le ho 
hlakisa hore na ke tlhahisoleseding efe e hlokang maemo a tshireletso ha ho tluwa 
ntlheng polokeho ya tlhahisoleseding ya sephiri.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VI 
ISISHWANKATHELO  
 
Umsantsa okhoyo ekukhuseleni ulwazi olukhethekileyo kurhulumente woMzantsi 
Afrika ubonisa ukuba onke amaSebe anolwazi analo olunokuba nkenenkene, kwaye 
oludinga ukhuseleko. Esi sifundo sibonisa ukuba asesichengeni amagosa 
karhulumente aye athi apha ekusebenzeni kwawo, adibane nolwazi olukhethekileyo, 
ngoba azisebenzisa gwenxa iindlela zokulawula ukhuseleko. Kukwacaca ukuba, 
ekubeni kungekho sikhokelo namigaqo isemthethweni, iinkqubo ezingasebenzi 
kakuhle zamaSebe karhulumente, ulwazi olukhethekileyo aluhlelwa ngendlela eyiyo 
kwaye lufumaneka kwiimeko ezingaluphathi ngokukhetheka. Ubukho besikhokelo 
nemigaqo yokhuseleko lolwazi inganceda  ekunqandeni isoyikiso esikhulu sobhukuqo 
mbuso nezinye iziganeko ezikrokrisayo, ezifana nokuthengiswa kolwazi, Esi sikhokelo 
singanceda nasekukhuseleni iingxelo zikarhulumente ezinkenenkene ngaphandle 
kokucinezela amalungelo abemi okufumana ulwazi njengoko uvuma uMgaqo Siseko. 
Oku kuya kuvelisa inkqubo yolwazi olunexabiso kwaye kuya kucacisa ukuba loluphi 
ulwazi oludinga imimiselo yokhuseleko malunga nokukhuselwa kolwazi 
olukhethekileyo. 
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CHAPTER 1  
GENERAL ORIENTATION AND METHODOLOGY 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The South African government departments work very closely with all the South 
African Security Clusters and other government institutions to stabilise the Republic of 
South Africa (RSA). The departments depend on the information that is collected, 
generated, processed, and finalised, in other to achieve the government’s mandate. 
The government departments attract business opportunities from all over the world, 
including developed countries. Therefore, the protection of classified information is 
essential to the departments and the country at large. The government departments 
have invested tremendously in information security and yet it appears as though their 
system is infiltrated on a daily basis. 
 
The aim of the research study was to explore the protection of classified information 
in the South African government departments. The researcher embarked on the 
background to the research problem and the nature, scope, and extent of the problem. 
The researcher presented the research aim, research purpose, and research 
questions.  The key concepts of the research were articulated, the value of the 
research, the preliminary literature study, research approach design, and data 
collection. The researcher further included the method to ensure the trustworthiness 
of the study, ethical considerations and concluded in this chapter. 
 
1.2 BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
 
The South African government departments produce highly sensitive information that 
requires protection, however, the country does not have a statutory framework that 
provides protection to the government’s classified information. The statutory 
framework can provide government departments that are entrusted with sensitive 
information, with the guidelines on how to manage the classification of information.  It 
can also give direction on how the reclassification and declassification of information 
process are conducted. The proposed South African Protection of Information Bill, 
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which repeals the Protection of Information Act 84 of 1982 (South Africa, 1982), 
regulate the process in which the government classified information must be protected. 
The Bill ensures that the government’s valuable information is not stolen or disclosed 
to unauthorised people. The submission of the Protection of Information Bill was 
approved by the South African Cabinet on the 5th of March 2008. It was later referred 
back by the Parliament, as a result of its technicalities and some of the details. Some 
of the concerns clauses that were raised by the Joint Standing Committee on 
Intelligence, includes the disclosure of classified information offense, hostile activity 
offenses, and public interest defence clause. The Bill was appropriately returned to 
the State Security for revision. 
 
State Security Agency (SSA) (South Africa, 2010) indicates that the Protection of 
Information Bill was revised. The views of the interested parties were taken into 
consideration, as well as empirical provisions that are mandatory for the protection of 
government classified information. The Bill was presented before the Cabinet 
Committee for Justice, Crime Prevention and Security on the 26 November 2009. The 
Committee recommended that Cabinet notes a request that the Ministers of State 
Security and of Justice and Constitutional Development further consult on the possible 
inclusion of minimum sentencing in Chapter 11 of the Bill. 
 
The South African Cabinet approved the Minimum Information Security Standard 
(MISS) on 4 December 1998 as the national information security policy. The MISS 
replaced the former Guidelines for the Protection of Classified Information of March 
1988. The MISS applies to all the South African government departments, and the 
South African Police Service (SAPS). 
 
The apartheid government used intelligence system to mislead the public and interest 
parties on State Information. Their method of record keeping was working parallel to 
State information that was meant to be accessible to the public. The State had a 
system that allows people to access State Information and they kept classified 
information restricted. The methods symbolize the apartheid government, which 
allowed the State to operate in secrecy, lack accountability, promote inequalities and 
abuse its powers. Prior to democratic South Africa in 1994, the apartheid government 
destroyed a lot of classified information without following procedures. To redress the 
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apartheid the mistakes of the past regimes, access to information was included as a 
constitutional right in South Africa (Currie, 2003:60). 
 
The apartheid system valued the power of information secrecy and enforced it to 
promote an anti-democratic society that was uninformed, precisely because they knew 
the impact it can make on the South African public. All other rights were basically 
compromised without the rights of access to information and declaration (McKinley, 
2003). Consequently, the democratic South African rejects to use similar methods that 
was used by anti-democratic State.  The 2008 version of the Bill was very clear on 
redressing the apartheid methods of record keeping and it further provided the 
decisive automatic declassification of records that were produced during the apartheid 
regime. The Bill considered how the apartheid State system used information secrecy 
to oppress the people, which stay outside of the archival custody beyond a period of 
20 years (Harris, 2013). 
 
Section 32 of the Constitution of the RSA, 1996, provides that everyone has a right of 
access to any information held by the State. Like any other right in the Constitution, 
this right may be limited by law to the extent necessary to protect other important rights 
and interest. South Africa has a comprehensive law setting out the procedures for 
relying on the right of access to information and the reason why the request may be 
refused. This is the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 (PAIA), an Act 
specifically provided for in the Constitution. Though it limits the right to access to 
information, PAIA is widely regarded as doing so in a constitutionally permissible 
manner. It strikes, in other words, the proper balance between the right to 
governmental transparency and the need to protect important countervailing interests.  
These include national security, defence, economic interests, and the criminal justice 
system.  A law like PAIA, that is intended to restrict access to information that has 
been classified in order to protect national security will necessarily be the one that 
limits section 32 of the Constitution (Harris, 2013). 
 
The South African media has over the years played an influential role in the all facets 
of the country, either positively or negatively. The media has always been viewed as 
a tool that has the potential to unite the people. The role manner in which the media 
platform has been utilized has a direct impact on the country’s democracy because if 
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it is negatively exploited, it is likely to develop an uncertainty to the investors. In recent 
years, the media has made it its business to criticize the political principals and their 
political parties. The media has always been seen as an essential democratic 
institution that can add value to sustainable development goals of the country. It can 
also promote equalities, social justice, peace an inclusive societies. The National 
Council of Provinces has defended The Protection of State Information Bill (2010) on 
the issue of silencing the South African media. Nevertheless, the concerns on the Bill 
will have an alarming effect on the media and would prevent and discourage the 
culture of information leaking. Its main objective is to ensure that intelligence structures 
are managing the government classified information according to the constitution of 
the country (Southall, 2012). 
 
Nathan (2009) indicates that the intelligence institutions need to be clear on which 
information meets the requirements of secrecy and which information must be 
transparent. In the democratic States, the constitution of the country must be observed 
when making these determinations. These principles incorporate government that is 
honest, open and that values the public’s rights to access data held by the government. 
They are fundamental since they are essential for responsibility and oversight, political 
and individual opportunity, popularity based contestation of intensity, hearty 
discussion and trade of thoughts, the full exercise of citizenship and the avoidance of 
maltreatment of power. The similar rationale is clear in South Africa’s Protection of 
State Information Bill; which tries to empower the general public, encourages everyone 
to full practices and ensure that their rights are protected. Conversely, as indicated by 
PAIA, the arrangement of government under apartheid did not respond to the public 
demands on transparency, and neither did they promote the culture of openness.  The 
system encouraged the public and private sectors to abuse its powers and violate the 
rights of the citizens.   
 
The MISS (South Africa, 1998) opine that government departments require security 
measures that would protect the sensitive information that they produce and process. 
The protection of government information is determined by the degree of sensitivity, 
which gives guidance on how information must be classified or graded. After the 
determination of sensitivity, the information would be labelled classified information, 
and it would require specific security measures. (South Africa, 1998). Democratic 
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South Africa still applies the protection mechanism that was used by the apartheid 
State, which encourages the unnecessary protection of massive amounts of 
information. This method contradicts the order of the new Constitution of South Africa, 
because to some degree, there is a default of secrecy. The Bill aims to reduce the 
volume of classified information in the government departments and balance the 
presumption of secrecy with the presumption of transparency. Furthermore, it also 
provides direction on which government information needs to be protected. 
 
1.3 THE NATURE, SCOPE AND EXTEND OF THE PROBLEM 
 
In this research, the problem is the quality of protection of classified information in the 
government departments. Grama (2011:10) asserts that the number of vulnerabilities 
appears to be growing and there are flaws in how internal information security is 
applied. The security breach allows aggressors to identify employees and hack their 
personal and work accounts, posing a threat to State Security. Nkwana (2015:4) 
alludes that the equipment that store classified information in the government 
departments is stolen regularly. Nkwana (2015:4) further states that the level of 
security breaches and unauthorized information disclosure is very high, despite the 
departments’ efforts to manage confidentiality and integrity. 
 
Price (2009) alludes that the departments that manage a high volume of sensitive 
information must contend with the internal officials who are breaching the security. In 
the environment, that process financial, privacy, personal and classified government 
information, should be aware of insider threat. The Protection of Information Bill 
indicates who has an authority to classify State information. Chapter 3 of the Bill state 
that Head of the departments has the authority to classify and reclassify State 
information. This can be achieved by using the classification level outlined in Section 
12 of the Act. The Bill alludes that the Head of the department as an Accounting Officer 
may delegate the duties to classify the information to the official at a senior level in 
writing. The provision to appoint adequately senior official is to ensure that the State 
information that is classified, meets all the requirement for protection and the official 
is highly informed. All individual items of information that falls under classified 
information would be categorised as classified.   
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SSA (South Africa, 2010) alludes that the Bill also indicates that when a member of 
the Security Service as contemplated in Chapter 11 of the Constitution who by the 
nature of their work deals with State information that may fall within the ambit of this 
Act, that person must classify such information in accordance with the classification 
level set out in section 5. The Bill further gives authority for the classification of 
information to the organs of State and the responsibility to declassify and downgrade. 
However, it also alludes to the fact that the heads of departments may authorize senior 
officials to take the responsibilities of downgrading and declassifying. The head of the 
department as an accounting officer may delegate such powers in writing. The SSA 
must identify the departments that have an unsuccessful rate of managing highly 
sensitive information and take their responsibility of handling of classified information 
and the functions of recording such information. They must also take the functions of 
classification and declassification of such records of a defunct department that have 
failed to protect the government’s information. This can be done through consultation 
with government executives and agencies before making final declassification 
determinations.   
 
The South African Press Association (SAPA:2015) posits that the operational gap 
between South African Intelligence system and the departments it is a cause for 
security breaches and the reason foreign spies have exposed the government's 
secrets. The reported documents allude that South African Intelligence lacks the skills 
and the well-trained personnel to defend the security of the State, and there are many 
foreign spies that are operating in South Africa. SAPA (2015) further reports that in 
2015, there were an estimated 140 foreign spies operating and gaining access to 
government departments, ministries, and even the Presidency. 
 
Van Rooyen (2013:156) points out that the attacks on information security and 
information technology (IT) system, it is more global and it is funded by seriously 
organised crime institutions. It is no longer easy to prosecute hackers because the 
investigators cannot link them with critical information that can be used as an evidence 
in the court of law. In the era of information security breaches, the department requires 
an advance strategic thinking on how to counter against the highly skilled and 
innovative criminals.    
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Du Plessis (2012) reports that the international digital security company providing a 
software application that has breach level index for tracing the past and the present 
security breaches that are reported online. The software name is Gemalto, and it was 
used to discover security breaches that occurred from 2010 to 2012 in South Africa, 
and it found nine significant breaches. The software indicates that the SAPS was the 
most infiltrated organization and have lost 15 000 personal records. It further reports 
that the aggressors were targeting personal information that is used to misrepresent 
the identities, and the sources of the breach were malicious outsiders. 
 
Saville (2012) reports that three South African government departments were hacked 
in 2012. The DSD web address population.gov.za opened to a dark page with a 
window containing the energised realistic site hacked by H4sniper and a realistic 
delineating a pulsing screen on Sunday morning. The Presidential National 
Commission and the National Population Unit's site were likewise hacked. At the point 
when approached about the explanations behind the assault, H4sniper reacted by 
email: "We as a whole realise that SA is the principal supporter of the Republican Arab 
Saharawi Democratic and the enemy of Morocco since quite a while and we are 
programmers and our objective is to safeguard our nation.'' 
 
The offenders are using sophisticated methods to infiltrate the government system, 
and that forces the department to acquire effectively and advance security 
applications. The departments must ensure that these applications are well 
safeguarded, particularly those that are fundamental to the department’s 
infrastructure. The department’s operational applications and operating system 
platforms must be secured, and that includes electronic mails (E-mail) and instant 
messaging (IM) applications. The government must modernize the information 
security system and recognize the security practices (Whitman & Mattord, 2015:48). 
The management in the departments must emphasise that it is a duty of every 
employee to secure the information of the departments, because of the manner in 
which information is exchanged on social media.  The departments must have 
mechanisms in place to counter against the unauthorized disclosure of sensitive 
information (Grama, 2011:2). The researcher collected information on threats and 
attacks by analysing the content of various literature sources. The categorizations may 
vary; threats are relatively well studied and equitably well understood. 
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1.4 AIM AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
 
Denscombe (2002:25) alludes that there must be a reason for doing research, to 
indicate the focus and provide criteria for the evaluation of the outcomes of research.  
The aim of this research was to evaluate the protection of classified information in the 
South African Government Departments. The research will follow the Denscombe 
(2002:27) guidelines: 
 To examine the South African legal mandate on protection of security information 
in the government institutions. 
 To describe the existing security risk control measures (SRCM) used for the 
protection of security information in government departments. 
 To determine the local and international best practices on protection of security 
information. 
 To recommend best practices on how to protect the security information of the   
government department. 
 
The research explores all actions, measures and means employed to achieve and 
ensure a condition of security commensurate with government classified information. 
 
1.5 KEY THEORETICAL CONCEPTS 
 
Leedy and Ormrod (2010:119) highlight that the purpose of defining of key concepts 
is to prevent any misunderstanding.   
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For the purpose of this study, the following key concepts are as follows: 
 
1.5.1 Information 
 
Information is referred to as any recorded or displayed data, knowledge, or content of 
communication. Regardless of its format, information is defined as the data that have 
been analysed and synthesised (Van der Westhuizen, Schellnach-Kelly & Geyer, 
2010:10).  Van Rooyen (2008:218) argues that information relates to any information, 
which you can hear directly or indirectly, taste, smell, touch or see. It also includes 
rumours and so-called stories. Ratcliffe (2008:96) refers to information as data, which 
can produce meaningful evidence during an investigation. 
 
1.5.2 Security Threats 
 
There are various definitions of security threats to information systems. Among these, 
are examples such as the one presented by Grama (2011:13) and Layton (2007:7) 
who define security threats as a successful exploitation against vulnerabilities in a 
system, whether accidentally or intentionally. Talbot and Jakeman (2008:141) define 
the security threat as anything that has the potential to prevent and hinder the 
achievement of objectives or disrupt the processes that support them.  
 
1.5.3 Vulnerabilities 
 
Vulnerability is a weakness of flaws in an information system. Vulnerabilities can 
exploit to harm information security.  They may be construction or design mistakes. 
They also may be flaws in how an internal safeguard is used or not used (Grama, 
2011:10). Rogers (2005:109) asserts that vulnerability implies that safety efforts are 
deficient; for instance, an advantage, for example, money might be presented to a 
security chance like burglary. Along these lines, vulnerability infers an absence of 
safety efforts in connection to security chance. 
 
Garcia (2001:303) alludes to vulnerability as an exploitable capacity or an exploitable 
security shortcoming or lack at an office of security intrigue. Exploitable capacities or 
shortcomings are those intrinsic in the structure of the office and its assurance or those 
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currently in view of the inability to meet endorsed security models when assessed 
against necessities for characterised dangers. In the event that the weakness was 
identified and misused by aggressors, at that point, it would sensibly be required to 
result in an effective assault making harm the office. 
 
The threats that are growing in frequency, variety, sophistication, and maliciousness 
make it difficult to identify security vulnerabilities. It is also difficult for security 
intelligence units to plan for every threat, or anticipate all forms of risks relate to leaking 
of classified information. 
 
1.6 THE VALUE OF THE RESEARCH 
 
The research outcome is intended to assist the South African government 
departments on how to protect the classified state information.  This will be achieved 
by describing the existing security measures, acknowledging the current threats and 
exploring the national and international best practices.  The value of this research will 
be essential to all the government departments, when dealing with information that 
has a potential to hurt the RSA, the departments, personnel and its resources. It is the 
precise procedure of gathering, examining and deciphering information with the end 
goal to expand scientist's comprehension of a wonder about which they are intrigued 
or concerned (Leedy & Ormrod, 2010:2). 
 
The study addressed the vulnerability of government employees and the 
interrelationships that exist between unethical, irregular and unlawful conduct. This will 
inform them of the obligation to uphold the principles and values of the Constitution, 
legislation, regulations, or directives relating to secrecy and the safeguarding the 
government’s classified information. The research will further promote the culture of 
accountability and effective governance, in particularly the public bodies that 
specifically dealing with classified information. 
 
It was envisaged that the study would contribute knowledge of the community and the 
learners who are studying towards security-related field. The research will also be 
available to the University of South Africa (UNISA) and the academic community and 
add to the academic body of knowledge. 
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1.7 RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
The researcher used the systematic review as a chosen research design. The 
thematic analysis is the process of identifying patterns or themes within qualitative 
data. Gough, Oliver and Thomas (2012:5) described systematic review as a form of 
research that identifies, describes, appraises, and synthesises the available research 
literature using systemic and explicit accountable methods. The researcher followed 
the Punch’s (2014:108) explanation of the criteria of systematic review as well as the 
steps that should be followed during systematic review that includes pre-specified 
protocols and formalised tools for searching, screening, coding, weighting, and 
integrating the literature. Braun and Clarke (2006:78) suggests that system review is 
the first qualitative method that should be learned as it provides core skills that will be 
useful for conducting many other kinds of analysis.   
 
The researcher collected data from various literature studies and newspapers from the 
past and the present. The researcher opted for more available and affordable way by 
reviewing existing studies. The researcher set aim and objectives of the study by 
critically analysing the research problem, and then he linked them with research 
questions to find the search strategy for this study. Neuman (2011:49) describes 
content analysis as used for examining the content contained in written documents or 
other communication media. 
 
The content analysis is an exploration strategy for the equitably, methodical and 
subjective portrayal of the show content correspondence (Bryman. 2012:289). Harris 
(2001:191) attests that content investigation is an adaptable research approach that 
can be connected to a wide assortment of content sources, helped by the accessibility 
of technology. The content analysis can adapt to more information. It may be utilised 
to research a point longitudinally through the examination of contemporary writings. 
Content analysis can be viewed as an unpretentious research approach in that it tends 
to be utilised to dissect normally happening information. Therefore, the content 
examination might be useful in decreasing the issue of social attractive quality 
inclination among respondents while exploring delicate themes. Yang and Miller 
(2008:689) suggest that content analysis is the systematisation of content 
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examination. It examines the frame and substance of correspondence. Basic 
implications and thoughts are uncovered through breaking down examples in 
components of the content, for example, words or expressions. 
 
1.8 POPULATION AND SAMPLING 
 
O’Leary (2014:356) argues that the data saturation is reached when collecting data no 
longer add additional understanding or aids in building theories. Matthews and Ross 
(2010:278) indicate that the selection of these newspaper articles for inclusion in the 
sample is validated stating that the documents are something  more than just a source 
of data since it is possible to research documents in their own right as a field of 
research. The approach that was used was to outline the keywords to filter information 
relevant to protection of government-classified information.   
 
Table 1.1 Sabinet Legal Table Frequency of pre-set keywords 
Keywords Frequency 
broad scope 
Percentage 
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION 13797 54% 
INFORMATION SECURITY 
THREATS 
4576 18% 
SECURITY CLEARANCE  7112 28% 
TOTAL 25485 100% 
 
The key terms mentioned in above Table 1.1 reduced to number of information 
sources and extracts information that could be used in the research in an attempt to 
answer the research hypothesis. The newspaper articles related to classified 
government information was found and used as a sample. The articles indicate that 
from 2012, the SSA and the departments are still struggling with the vetting of 
government officials. The newspaper articles reports that the thousands of 
government officials and employees of state-owned companies dealing with supply 
chain management had not been vetted as a mechanism to tackle corruption, despite 
a 2014 Cabinet memo instructing the SSA to vet all supply chain employees.  Pneumol 
(2018) defines inclusion criteria as the key features of the target population that the 
investigators will use to answer their research questions. In this study, the inclusion 
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criteria are the concepts government departments, security breach, and classified 
information and security measures. Pneumol (2018) further defines exclusion criteria 
as features of the potential study participants who meet the inclusion criteria but 
present with additional characteristics that could interfere with the success of the study 
or increase their risk for an unfavourable outcome.  In this study, the researcher 
excluded all articles that did not have government departments, security breach, 
classified information, and security measures in its key concepts. 
 
Table 1.2 Percentage of the inclusion and exclusion criteria 
Keywords Inclusion 
criteria 
Percentage Exclusion 
criteria 
Percentage Total 
CLASSIFIED 
INFORMATION 
1 0.0039% 13796 54.13% 54.1339 
INFORMATION 
SECURITY 
THREATS 
3 0.012% 4573 17.95% 17.952 
SECURITY 
CLEARANCE 
1 0.0039% 7111 27.90% 27.9139 
Total 5 0.2% 25480 99.98% 100 
 
The researcher selected newspaper articles that are most relevant to the study and 
assessed how the decision will affect the validity of the study. The researcher used 
different variable to define both inclusion and exclusion criteria in Table 1.2, and 
ensured that they relate to the objective of the study. The table shows less percentage 
on inclusion criteria because the researcher identified key variables that are needed 
to make a statement about the validity of the study results.  
  
14 
 
Table 1.3 Newspaper articles analysed 
Author and date Title of article Inclusion Criteria 
Du Plessis. 2012 Police database hack 
tops list of SA security 
breaches. 
Government Department 
Security breach. 
Reisinger. 2017 When Government’s need 
for secrecy clashes with 
the Public’s Right to Know 
Government Department 
Classified Information.  
SAPA. 2015 Foreign spies hacked SA 
government computers.  
Government Department 
Security measures.  
Saville. 2012 Three SA government 
websites hacked on 
Sunday. 
Government Department 
Security measures.  
Serrao. 2017 Senior Crime Intelligence 
Officials without top 
secret clearances. 
Government Department 
Security Clearances.  
Total 5 5 
 
The researcher did not deal with specific individuals in his sampling, but used data 
primarily from printed mass media reports like newspaper articles related to the topic. 
Miles, Huberman and Saldana (2013) underscore that the sampling in qualitative 
research tends to be more purposive than random. The non-probability sampling 
method includes an element of subjective judgement. The researcher used non-
probability sampling and specifically purposive sampling method, and selected data 
from accessible newspaper articles that relate to the topic. The keywords were 
outlined from the study as the criteria and the researcher used his personal judgement 
to select the articles that are relevant to protection of government-classified 
information. 
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1.9 DATA COLLECTION 
 
The researcher used media reports as a major database on his study. The researcher 
collected and identified the material that is relevant to his topic through the 
newspapers, and the articles that available on public domain. Maxfield and Babbie 
(2005:209) allude that the value of research depends on how the data are gathered. 
Mills and Birks (2014:40) accentuate that the newspapers are examples of literature 
that can provide data for qualitative studies. 
 
Flick (2015:164) opines that some sources see quantitative content analysis rather as 
a specific method for collecting data while other sources see quantitative content 
analysis as a mixture of analytic technique and data collection procedure. Flick (ibid) 
further indicates that it is used for collecting and classifying information, such as in 
newspaper articles.  Although the researcher followed a qualitative approach in this 
study, the researcher applied a quantitative content analysis to ascertain the frequency 
of identified themes or categories that emerged in the printed mass media reports 
within the topic-classified information, information security threats and security 
clearance (section 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3). 
 
The Department of Justice and Constitutional Development (2014) postulates that 
during the National Assembly, the political opposition parties requested the status of 
the  Senior Management Service officials of the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) 
who have valid security clearances from the Minister of Justice and Correctional 
Services. The Minister admitted that his Department had a three-year backlog and 
senior officials were operating without the valid security clearances.  The same 
question was asked to the Minister of Social Development during the National 
Assembly, and she admitted that not all her staff is vetted, but the South African Social 
Security Agency has prioritised the officials in sensitive positions such as those in 
Supply Chain Management, Finance, Grants Administration, and Executive 
Managers.  
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1.10 DATA ANALYSIS 
 
Cohen, Manion and Morrison (2000) demonstrate that in qualitative research, data 
examination starts simultaneously with the procedure of information gathering. They 
feature the reasons as the findings of early information investigation manage resulting 
information gathering, which assumes a vital job in information determination and 
decrease. Early information investigation permits opportune guessing about 
outcomes. Schwandt (2007) implies that the examination should be thorough, efficient, 
restrained, and precisely methodologically reported. Subsequently, in qualitative data 
analysis, the researcher realises the significance of information in an efficient, 
complete and thorough way. 
 
Holloway and Todres (2003) indicate that qualitative approaches are staggeringly 
differing, complex and nuanced, and topical investigation ought to be viewed as a 
primary strategy for qualitative analysis. They further contend that it is the principal 
qualitative method of analysis that analysts ought to learn, as it gives centre abilities 
that will be valuable for leading numerous different types of subjective investigation. 
Braun and Clarke (2006:78) concur with Holloway and Todre (2003) that thematic 
analysis is perceived as a foundational method for qualitative analysis, and it is used 
as a method for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns within data. In the same 
vein, O’Reilly and Kiyimba (2015:75) concur with Braun and Clarke (2006:77-101), by 
defining the thematic analysis as a method used to identify, analyse and report 
patterns within a data set, allowing for the descriptive organisation of the data in a way 
that facilitates interpretation of various aspects of the research topic.     
 
The researcher has read the relevant books, newspaper articles and information on 
the Internet to get a global perspective of protection of government classified 
information, and to familiarise himself with the data. The researcher analysed all data 
he collected and selected only the most relevant data to bring meaning into the 
research. Data collected forms part of the qualitative approach that were decided on 
for this research, and further adopted the steps set out in thematic analysis.   
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Braun and Clarke (2006: 77-101) provide a six-phase guide, which is very useful 
framework for conducting thematic analysis as follows: 
 
Step 1: The researcher reads the entire data collection carefully to obtain a sense of 
the whole and made his own notes. 
Step 2: The researcher started to organise the data in a meaningful and systematic 
way.  The researcher used coding to reduce huge volumes of data into small chunk to 
obtain meaning.  The method of coding is determined by the researcher’s perspective 
and research objectives.  
Step 3: After the reading of data, similarities were identified and grouped together for 
a theme. The researcher made a list of similar topics and clustered them together. All 
materials that focus on classified information were put in the same column, and the 
one focusing on protection of government information was put on another column. 
Step 4: The researcher applied the list of topics to the data by using a form of 
abbreviation as codes, which are written nest to the appropriate columns. The 
researcher organised the scheme to merge the columns and their codes. The data 
associated with each theme are read and considered whether they really support the 
theme.  
Step 5: The researcher recognized most distinct working for the points and sorted 
them. Lines are attracted between classifications to demonstrate the connections. The 
point is to recognise the substance of what the every them is about, how would they 
connect and identify with the primary topic, and how do the subject identify with one 
another. 
Step 6: The researcher settled on an official conclusion on the shortened form for 
every classification and alphabetised the codes. The information is collected and a 
preliminary analysis is performed. The researcher recodes existing material if 
essential. 
 
The steps that were followed in this qualitative research allowed the researcher to 
understand the fundamental of the topic in short period of time. The steps give 
direction and make it easy to analyse and avoid possible gaps in interpretation of data 
collected. 
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1.11 TRUSTWORTHINESS 
 
Denscombe (2002:100) indicates that validity is about the accuracy of the questions 
asked, the data collected and the explanation offered. According to Creswell (2005: 
01) and Leedy and Ormrod (2005:105), terms such as dependability, conformability, 
verification, transferability, trustworthiness, authenticity, and credibility, are used to 
describe the idea of validity. However, Creswell (2005:01) asserts that this can also 
be referred to as the ‘qualitative validity’ in a qualitative study. 
 
The study is qualitative and therefore in order to ensure that this is fitting, credible and 
confirmable, the following elements were employed: 
 
1.11.1 Credibility 
 
Polit and Hungler (1999) show that credibility manages the focal point of the 
exploration and alludes to trust in how well information and procedures of investigation 
address the expected core interest. The principal question concerning credibility 
emerges when settling on a choice about the focal point of the study, determination of 
setting and the way to deal with social affair information. For the purpose this study, 
the researcher linked the research study’s findings with the reality of South African’s 
protection of government-classified information in order to demonstrate the truth of the 
research study’s findings. The researcher further focuses on another important 
technique of credibility, which is triangulation. 
 
1.11.2 Triangulation 
 
Triangulation as a research tool provides the study with more stringent and reliable 
validity and credibility as described by Hussein (2009) because the researcher uses 
multiple sources or multiple approaches to analyse data collected. In this way, the 
researcher looks for and finds convergence among multiple and different sources of 
information to form themes or categories in a study, again with the sole purpose of 
increasing the validity of the study (Creswell & Miller 2000; Guion, Diehl & McDonald, 
2011). The study point is to gain good understanding from different perspectives on 
protection of government classified information. It is more to increase the level of 
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knowledge about something and to strengthen the researcher’s standpoint from 
various aspects. For the purpose of this research, the researcher used data and 
theoretical triangulation. 
 
The researcher utilised data analysis triangulation in order to understand the 
protection of government classified information more fully for school of criminal justice 
and beyond. For the purpose of this study, the researcher analysed the literature 
sources from different writers and their findings about the topic. Furthermore, he 
promoted rigour in qualitative research by using of the analyses outlined in the study. 
 
Theoretical triangulation is defined as the use of multiple theories in the same study 
for the purpose of supporting or refuting findings since different theories help 
researchers to find problem at hand using multiple lenses (Thurmond, 2001:253-258). 
Guion, et al. (2011) assert that theory triangulation involves the use of multiple 
perspectives to interpret a singles set of data. For the purpose of this study, the 
researcher analysed and synthesise the description of reported cases where classified 
information from government departments were not sufficiently protected. 
 
1.11.3 Dependability 
 
Lincoln and Guba (1985:299) indicate that dependability seeks means of considering 
both factors of instability and factors of phenomenal or design induced changes, that 
is, the degree to which data change over time and alterations made in the researcher’s 
decisions during the analysis process. For the purpose of this study, the researcher 
ensured that the study’s findings are consistent and repeatable with the raw data he 
collected and interpreted on protection of classified information. 
 
1.11.4 Transferability 
 
Trustworthiness also includes the question of transferability, which refers to the extent 
to which the findings can be transferred to other settings or groups (Polit & Hungler, 
1999). To facilitate transferability, it is valuable to give a clear and district description 
of culture and context, data collection and process of analysis. For the purpose of this 
study, the researcher provide the evidence that could be applicable when dealing with 
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government classified information, however, he cannot prove that the study’s findings 
will be applicable. 
 
1.11.5 Documents, journal articles and books 
 
Denscombe (2012:21) argues that validity on documents needs to be established and 
evaluated in relation to authenticity, representatives, meaning, and credibility.  
Denscombe (2012:22) further alludes that the academic journals and commercial 
publishers have their material refereed by experts in the field. Therefore, the 
researcher has some assurance about the quality of their content. 
 
1.12 BRACKETING 
 
Gearing (2004:1430) explains bracketing as a scientific process in which a researcher 
suspends or holds in abeyance the presuppositions, biases assumptions, theories, or 
previous experiences to see and describe the phenomenon. Therefore, the researcher 
will hold his opinions to ensure that his experience in Counter Intelligence and ideas 
about protection of classified information in South African government clouds his 
judgement. 
 
The researcher has previously worked for the SAPS from 2002 to 2014. He started his 
career as a Data Capturer for Crime Intelligence Gathering Unit. He then became an 
Investigator and gained an extensive background and training in both Criminal and 
Corporate Investigation. He has also worked for Crime Intelligence Unit, under 
Counter Intelligence within the SAPS, and he was used as trainer and mentor for new 
Vetting Officers. During the duration of this study, the researcher is employed at the 
Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) under the Directorate 
Vetting Field Investigation and Integrity Management. 
 
1.13 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
The researcher must anticipate any ethical issues that may arise during the qualitative 
research process (Creswell, 2009:20). This section will discuss the ethical 
considerations in terms of Unisa Policy on Research Ethics (2013). They must look 
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closely at the ethical implications of what they are proposing to do (Leedy & Ormrod, 
2010:100). The researcher has applied for informed consent and he received it from 
the College of Law Ethical Clearance Committee. The certificate is included attached 
as Addendum A. The researcher cited in-text references for all the sources observing 
the policies set by Unisa on Research Ethics (Unisa, 2013). Plagiarism was avoided 
by acknowledging the entire source and includes the list of references used on the 
study, and the researcher screened the dissertation through Turnitin to determine the 
authenticity figure, which amounted to 32%.   
 
1.14 SUMMARY 
 
The researcher introduced the research study and discussed the problem, the 
research objective, research design, and the methodology. The researcher followed a 
reliable design for this research, as recommended and described by literature, which 
ensured that the content analyst is reliable and valid. The researcher found adequate 
literature to fulfil the research objectives as well as the aim of the research.   
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CHAPTER 2  
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED 
INFORMATION OF SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The amendment of the old apartheid South Africa’s legislation on information security 
is a prerequisite. This incorporates the drafting of a legal framework to regulate the 
identification and processing of government information that warrants protection 
against demolition, amendment, and disclosure. The new Acts are meant to regulate 
the manner in which the government information may be protected.  It is likewise to 
advance honesty and responsibility in administration while perceiving that data might 
be protected from exposure with the end goal to protect the national intrigue. It builds 
up general standards as far as which State data might be dealt with and secured in a 
protected constitutional democracy. The study examines the South African legal 
framework on the protection of government-classified information and the national 
policies and procedures that are used to safeguard the information.   The study 
highlights the principal changes in the working draft of the new Protection of 
Information Act and the need for new information protection mechanism. 
 
2.2 THE ACTS WHICH DIRECT THE PROTECTION OF INFORMATION IN SOUTH 
AFRICA 
 
Section 209 of the RSA Constitution, 1996, gives provision for intelligence system in 
South Africa. The SSA, South African National Defence Force  and SAPS are the three 
intelligence bodies empowered by the National Strategic Intelligence Act 39 of 1994 
as amended by Act 67 of 2002, to determine security competency of its employees. 
All the government departments must develop their Information Security Policies and 
align them with the Constitution of South Africa. 
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2.2.1 National Strategic Intelligence Act 39 of 1994 as amended by Act 67 of 
 2002 
 
Section 2A (1) (a) (b) of National Strategic Intelligence Act 39 of 1994 as amended by 
Act 67 0f 2002 empowers the intelligence bodies with the responsibility of security 
screening investigation in a prescribed manner for every person who is employed by 
or is an applicant to an organ of state. The Act focuses on companies which has 
applied to render services to the government departments, and which services may 
give them access to information that is classified or to assets that are regarded as 
critical to the State. The Act gives government departments’ powers to conduct 
background checks on officials of occupies positions that designated as the national 
key points of the State. 
 
2.2.2 Protection of Information Act 84 of 1982 
 
Section 4 of the Protection of Information Act 84 of 1982 prohibits the disclosure of 
information that requires protection, however, it contradicts with the constitution of the 
Constitutional provisions relating to presumptions. The Act does not provide for criteria 
relating to the presentation of government's information before the courts of law, it 
further excludes relevant offenses and minimum sentences for offenders  (South 
Africa, 1982). 
 
2.2.3 The National Archives of South Africa Act 43 of 1996  
 
The National Archives of South Africa Act 43 of 1996 is tasked with the mission to 
protect the rights of the people and to stabilize the national archival heritage for the 
benefit of all South Africans. The Act is promoting the culture of accountability and the 
government that is transparent to the people by applying proper management and 
care of government records.  It ensures the efficient and effective services are 
provided to the public and the national archives have a national identity that the public 
can relate to and trust.  It provides for a corporation and collaboration between National 
Archives Advisory Council and the South African Heritage Resources Agency on 
advisory functions, and forms part of the National Estate. The Act provides provision 
for the protection of records and relies on the assistant of the Public Protector on the 
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investigation of the unauthorised destruction of records, and the annual business plan 
must be submitted to the Minister for approval (South Africa,1996).   
 
2.2.4 Intelligence Service Act 65 of 2002 
 
Section 26 (a), (f) and (g) of the Intelligence Services Act 65 of 2002 makes it an 
offence for any person and members and former members of any intelligence service 
to disclose classified information under certain circumstances. Regulations E of Part 
II of Chapter 1 of the Public Service Regulations, 2001 prohibits an employee from 
releasing official information to the public without the necessary authority (South 
Africa, 2002). 
 
2.2.5 Minimum Information Security Standard (MISS) Cabinet Document 
 
On 4 December 1998, the South African Cabinet approved the MISS as the national 
information security policy. The MISS replaced the former Guidelines for the Protection 
of Classified of March 1988. The MISS applies to all departments of State subject to 
the Public Service Act 103 of 1994 or any other department that handles classified 
information in the national interest. 
 
The MISS document (1998) sets out a range of measures to protect classified 
information, and what type of information needs protection. It provides provision for 
classification of documents and the reclassification processes. It provides guidance 
on how classified information must be handled and stored and the processes of 
removing the documents from the government’s premises. Chapter 5 of the MISS 
gives provision for conducting the personnel security vetting. It states that all 
government officials must undergo the vetting process and meet the requirement set 
for security clearance. The security clearance gives the department a guide on the 
degree of information that an individual can have access to, but this is subject to the 
need-to-know principle. It further provides the procedures that must be followed when 
conducting security screening and the validity of the security clearance.  Some 
chapters in the document set out procedures to physical security and how access to 
classified information must be controlled. It also covers IT and communication security 
(South Africa, 1998). 
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The legal status of the MISS is not clear because it is not an approved legislation, but 
a Cabinet document setting out the national information security policy. All the 
government departments that handle the government’s classified information and 
assets must adhere to the MISS document (Section 1.2). The MISS document (1998) 
address all the important applications that must be followed to prevent the disclosure 
of government information. It provides the four information classification categories, 
and that includes “top-secret”, “secret”, “classified” and “restricted”.  It also explains 
that personnel confidential, is not a security classification, however, records with this 
grouping are taken cared of similarly as classified reports. This MISS document is 
constrained by the unlawfulness of its engaging legislation, and it is planned to give a 
fleeting national security strategy for South Africa. 
 
The South African Law Reform Commission (2005:13) alludes that it is a global 
practice for privacy or information protection Acts to have a set of principles that must 
be adhered to when managing sensitive information. The legalization of management 
of information privacy has been found to be an appropriate mean of translating the 
concepts. However, all the legal instruments and policies provide the principles of 
information privacy.   The researcher referred to the MISS (1998), which indicates that 
the more harmful the information is, the more it has to be protected from transgressors. 
The South African Law Reform Commission (2005:13) added that security measures 
must approach every sensitive information separately and grade it according to its 
merits. 
 
2.2.6 The Public Service Act 103 of 1994 
 
Section 3 (4) of the Public Service Act 103 of 1994 indicates that the Public Service 
Administration may issue mandates regarding security requirement to which officers 
and employees shall comply. Section 17 (2) (h) of the Public Service Act provides that 
an employee may be discharged if their continued employment constitutes a security 
risk to the State (South Africa, 1994). 
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2.2.7 The South African Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 
 
The South African Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 compels fairness on objectivity 
when carrying out Personnel Security Vetting. The National Vetting Policy Guidelines 
issued by National Intelligence Coordinating Committee (NICOC) on 22 January 1997 
interprets the directives in the MISS and guides the application of Personnel Security 
Vetting in institutions. NICOC is the organisation in charge of coordinating the activities 
and exercises of all of the South African Intelligence Agencies, and examining the 
processed information received from those Agencies.  It reports to Cabinet-level by 
means of the Minister of State Security. The SSA defines vetting investigation as a 
systematic process of gathering information about the person who is under 
investigation to determine their security competence. This is an investigative process 
carried out to determine the people’s security competence by checking their 
background to determine a person’s integrity and reliability regarding classified 
information as well their loyalty to the Constitution of the RSA. The security competent 
person is determined by the person’s ability to act in a manner that will not cause 
classified information or material to fall in unauthorised hands. The levels of security 
clearance are three, which includes confidential, which is valid for ten years. The 
secret clearance and the top-secret are valid for five years (South Africa, 1998). 
 
2.2.8 Promotion of Access to Information Act of 2000 (PAIA) 
 
PAIA (2000) state that to access any data held by the State and any data that is held 
by someone else and that is required for the activity or assurance of any rights. The 
Act facilitates transparency, accountability and good governance. In addition, the Act 
indicates that once persons have identified the information or record they want or 
need, they need to request PAIA  form that must be completed and submitted to the 
relevant Information Officer or Deputy Information Officer by post, physical address, 
fax number, or E-mail address together with the request fee (South Africa, 2000). 
 
2.2.9 Protection of Personal Information (POPI) Act 
 
Welz (2016) indicates that Section 19 Protection of Personal Information (POPI) Act 4 
of 2013 stipulates that all officials who are charged with the responsibilities to manage 
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personal information have a responsibility to follow correct procedures to prevent the 
loss of information. The officials are expected to handle information in a manner that 
would prevent the damage and unauthorised destruction of personal information. 
Furthermore, Welz (2016) alludes that the identification of threats must be established 
and the security measures must in place as part of the department’s risk management.  
The effectiveness of the security measures must be regularly verified and updated in 
response to new risks or identify deficiencies in existing security applications. 
 
Section 20 of POPI Act (2013) stipulates that the processing of personal information 
must be authorised by the employer. The officials execute their functions on behalf of 
the employer and they need authority to handle and process personal information.  
The authorisation must be clear on what information they can access and further 
oblige them to maintain the integrity and confidentiality of the information. The 
department must implement the effective methods to ensure that all officials from the 
level of management to entry-level comply with the security measures.   
 
Section 21(2) of POPI Act (2013) postulates that all government officials must sign the 
declaration of secrecy, that also oblige them to report any security breach or illegal 
disclosure of State information. Welz (2016) supports Section 21(2) of the POPI Act 
(2013) and further maintains that the departments must implement this security 
measures as part of the newly recruited officials’ contracts. The contract must bind the 
officials to notify the department’s information regulators of any security breaches, or 
if they have been approached by any malicious outsider to disclose the State 
information. This process ensures that the personal information that has been 
entrusted with the department does not fall on the hands of the aggressors, and the 
officials themselves are protected.  Welz (2016) explains that personal information 
cannot be provided without the proof of identity, and this information must be provided 
free of charge. Access to this information is subjected to PAIA, and the details of such 
information can be obtained through an inquiry. The details of third parties 
dissemination of such information can be provided. 
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2.2.10 Protected Disclosures Act 26 of 2000 – The Whistle Blowers Protection 
Act 
 
The Protected Disclosures Act 26 of 2000 addresses the unlawfulness or irregularities 
within the public and private sector, and it allows officials with integrity to report such 
activities. However, the Act does not apply to independent contractors. The Act 
enables the employer to react on time before the damage has occurred and to apply 
necessary corrective measures. It encourages honest officials to report wrongdoing 
and exposes malicious insiders. The Act aims at reducing criminal and corporate 
offenses that include but not limited to corruption, breach of contract, corporate fraud 
and forgery, breach of the administrative law, and threats to the environment. It implies 
to information that is confidential and extends to malpractice occurring overseas 
(South Africa, 2000). 
 
2.2.11 The principal changes in the working draft of the Secret Bill 
 
The SSA (2010) indicates that the principal changes between the proposed Protection 
of Information Bill (2010) and the current working draft includes the Chapter 5 of the 
2008 and 2010 Bills, which have been deleted. The removed Chapter 5 was widely 
defined and interested groups described it as a controversial concept in the Bill. A few 
concerns incorporated the likelihood of classification of material on grounds of the 
national intrigue and the direction of an expansive scope of preparing of important 
State data. The meaning of this model continues as before as it was in the 2008 and 
the 2010 Bills and is generally barely characterized. The main foundation for order is 
currently national security. 
 
The removal of Chapter 5 means that the Bill no longer serves the broad purpose of 
regulating the secure processing of valuable state information. In a conventional 
sense, it is now a narrowed official secret legislation. As was indicated above, the 
original Bill presented broad information security aspects and was seen to be out of 
place in the legislation. The removal of Chapter 5 was well received and described as 
well developed. If the Bill can be enacted, it would repeal the MISS document (1998), 
and the Protection of Information Act 84 of 1982. This would unregulated the 
government information that is unrelated to the national security. This is unwanted and 
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thought ought to be given to what happens to the erased parts of the Bill. The key 
classification of the Act portraying the criteria for order in the three security levels, 
which incorporates confidential, secret and top secret. 
 
Higher Education South Africa (HESA) (2012:18) indicates that section 3 of the Bill 
gives provision on how all government department must protect the valuable 
information of the State. It further focuses on the functions of the intelligence and 
oversight structures of the government in relation to classification, reclassification, and 
declassification of information processes. The government departments must receive 
directives from the Minister of SSA if they want to classify the information, upon 
application by an interested department. HESA (2012:18) states that the provision 
indicates that any department that has demonstrated its capacity to protect the 
classified State Information can apply for an opt-in clause that would grant them the 
power of classification. This can amenable the abuse of power, because the provision 
is too broad and it does not provide for the criteria for granting permission. 
 
2.2.12 The need for new information protection mechanism 
 
SSA (2010) reports that with the absence of a comprehensive statutory framework, 
the government is producing a high volume of information without a clear provision on 
which information requires protection. This has resulted in government overspending 
on resources; create an unstable classification and declassification environment, 
excessive cost and inappropriate implementation. The government departments have 
an enormous amount of classified information and documentation, and they lack clarity 
and direction on what actually requires protection (South Africa, 2010).   
 
The SSA (2010) indicates that the current protection mechanism is inconsistent with 
the Constitution of the RSA, 1996, and it has inherited the apartheid State approaches 
that encourage the unnecessary protection of massive amounts of information.  There 
still to some degree a default position of secrecy. The Bill intends to strengthen the 
protection of State information and give direction on what information needs 
protection. The aim of the current reforms is to significantly reduce the volume of 
classified information and balance the presumption of secrecy with a presumption of 
openness. 
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SSA (South Africa, 2010) opines that an extensive statutory establishment for the 
order and declassification of data is probably going to result in a more steady and 
practical arrangement of approaches and a more predictable use of standards and 
strategies. An authoritative reason for the classification and declassification system, 
setting up clear managing standards while holding wide specialist inside government 
to build up and direct the points of interest of the framework, offers a handy and more 
unsurprising approach to accomplish important changes. A statutory structure is 
required, which can manage essential issues and determine what data might be 
characterized and who may order such data. Therefore, it should be clear on when 
should classified information be declassified and who can declassify information.  The 
duration of classification should be mentioned and the procedures for classification 
and declassification (South Africa, 2010).  
 
SSA (2010) indicates that the framework indicates what system should be established 
to ensure the review of classified information and what criteria or factors should be 
considered when classified information is reviewed. The variables, for example, what 
system for the review of classified information ought to be built up and what criteria or 
elements ought to be viewed as when grouped data is explored. It ought to think about 
what methodology ought to be made for solicitations for the classified status of 
information and if so what sort of processes and who may make such applications. It 
ought to be evident whether the declassified data ought to be discharged to the 
general population or not. The criteria ought to demonstrate a focal database with all 
declassified data, which is accessible to people in general, and if this is true, who 
should build up and keep up such a database. The structure should direction what sort 
of oversight is required for the arrangement of data insurance, and what ought to be 
the medicine identifying with State Information amid court procedures (South Africa, 
2010). 
 
According to the SSA (2010), the point is to have a statutory framework that gives 
guidance to those in government who are responsible for information security; 
significantly decrease the measure of State data that is protected from divulgence. It 
further gives more insurance to that information that genuinely requires protection; and 
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to adjust the information protection routine with the qualities, rights, and opportunities 
cherished in the Constitution. 
 
The Protection of Information Bill is intended to make sure that there is a sound way 
to deal with the security of State information. This will enable the State to respond to 
the infiltrations and other related threatening practices. The Bill sets out methodology 
on how sensitive information that has been classified are dealt with amid court 
procedures and requires a court to avoid open revelation of classified reports that 
frame some portion of court records. It additionally provides for particular undercover 
work and related offenses, for example, block attempt of or impedance with classified 
information, the arrangement of false data to a National Intelligence Structure and 
denial of exposure of a State security matter. A first draft Bill was distributed in the 
Gazette for remarks amid March 2008 (South Africa, 2010). 
 
The Protection of Information Bill's point is to make sure that there is an intelligent way 
to manage and secure the information of the State. It also provides clarity and direction 
on how to conduct the process of classifying and declassifying of State information. It 
creates a legislative framework for the State to react to malicious undercover work and 
related antagonistic exercises that aimed at compromising the classified information 
of the State. The Bill, as it is known, sets out systems on how classified documents 
are to be taken care of amid court procedures, and expects courts to counteract open 
divulgence of characterized archives that shape some portion of court records (South 
Africa, 2010). 
 
On the one hand, the objective the of Protection of Information Bill is to create a 
statutory framework that would protect the government departments and the 
information that is generated by all the organs of State.  It is also to set out criteria and 
processes in terms of which State Information may be protected from destruction or 
from unlawful disclosure. The framework would set out criteria and processes in terms 
of which information which is protected from disclosure and which is classified may be 
declassified. It also creates offenses and proposed minimum sentences for unlawful 
disclosure of information, including the crime of espionage and to make it an offense 
for an individual to knowingly supply false information to the national intelligence 
structures and to establish guidelines for the treatment by courts of classified 
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documents (SSA:2010). On the other hand, the Protection of Information Bill (2010) 
provides for the Minister for State Security to issue regulations on information security 
across government, and repeal the existing Protection of Information Act 84 of 1982.  
 
These constitutional obligations were carried out through the making of laws by 
Parliament, the creation of structures and institutions and the exercise of executive 
authority by the President together with other members of the Cabinet. The executive 
is specifically empowered to develop and implement national policy and implement 
national legislation to achieve the constitutional objectives referred to above. Realizing 
such objectives includes the protection of information. 
 
2.3 SUMMARY 
 
The chapter discussed the South African framework on protection of government-
classified information to obtain an understanding of the legislation in place. The 
chapter includes the national laws and regulations prohibit the disclosure of certain 
information. The researcher commenced the chapter with the Constitution of South 
African and the laws that talk to protection of information. The next chapter focuses on 
the literature perspectives on protection of classified information. 
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CHAPTER 3  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The chapter focuses on what has been written about the protection of government-
classified information in the form of journals, books, newspaper articles, and legislation 
as sources. The researcher used the objectives of the study to explore the chasm in 
the protection of classified information in South African government departments. The 
researcher describes the existing SRCM used for the protection of security information 
in government departments, and further determines the local and international best 
practices for the protection of security information. 
 
3.2 SECURITY RISK CONTROL MEASURES 
 
Hagen, Albrechtsen and Hovden (2008:377-397) report that the Norwegian 
organisations have implemented successful technical administrative security 
measures and policies for the protection of government information. Based on the 
organisational assessment tool, the awareness programs have been proven more 
effective security measures than the technical administrative.   
 
The departments can achieve its strategic goals and objectives through effective 
security measures, and identify areas of weakness in their information security system.   
If the departments’ information security measures are effectively implemented, it can 
ensure accountability from management and officials tasked with the responsibility to 
prevent security breaches and none-compliance. This measurement programs can 
ensure that the departments’ classified information is secured and the security agency 
can accomplish its mandate. If this security measures can be implemented and 
maintained, it would demonstrate the departments’ compliance with the Constitution 
and the relevant laws of the country (Chew, Swanson, Stine, Bartol, Brown, & 
Robinson, 2008). 
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Alshboul (2010) indicates that the departments must understand their business vision 
and align their security requirements with what the department want to achieve. If the 
department values their information, security it is important to implement the 
appropriate security measures. The information security breaches can be prevented 
only if the department put in place systems that would ensure compliance from the 
employees. The department must respond to challenges that are presented by new 
technologies, software applications and network devices by developing security 
policies and new security measures that can address the new threats. The attacks on 
the departments’ information security system have huge financial implications, 
negative impact on customer confidence and it damages the reputation of the 
department. The challenges and threats must be analysed, and the departments must 
be determined if these threats are coming from inside or outside aggressors.  
 
Eduardo and Santos (2014) allude that to protect information and other associated 
assets, organisations have to have a set of information security measures that are 
recommended by international standards and models widely accepted by 
professionals and organizations around the world. Eduardo and Junior (2014) prefer 
these controls, including organisational security measures, and further, describe them 
as a clear and strategic method to secure information and the assets of the department 
against threats that exploit the vulnerabilities of the employees. If these practices can 
be implemented and well maintained, it can minimize the risk and the impact of 
exploitation. 
 
Harris (2013) reports that most departments overlook the technicalities and 
administrative elements that physical security has on the departments. The 
departments’ physical security is often ignored when discussing the information 
security because the focus is always on the technology-oriented security 
countermeasures. Brotby (2006:8) concurs with Harris (2013) that information security 
is not only a technical issue and government challenge that involves sufficient risk 
management. Brotby (2006:8) adds that the active involvement of senior officials on 
the assessment of emerging threats and the departments’ response them, would 
ensure effective protection of classified information and encourage accountability. 
Ghernaouti-Helie (2007) underscores that if the departments can minimise the level in 
which the security incidents are happening and the damage that is causing to the 
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normal operations, they would ensure achieve their mandate. In that way, it would 
educate government departments that security is not only a technical matter, but also 
it has a direct impact of the day-to-day running of the departments.  
 
Nkwana (2015:vi) shares the same view with Brotby (2006:8) that the departments’ 
executives and management staff must be committed to security risk controls of the 
departments. The management must be directly involved in the assessment of 
emerging threats that the departments are facing and provide support and sufficient 
resources. They must provide strategically and continues initiatives to establish the 
effective protection of security information.   
 
Perkel (2010) points out that there are problems in protecting information in these 
organisations because IT professionals attempt to protect information and knowledge, 
as researcher, students and research project teams have specific needs and demand 
the freedom to develop their activities. Thus, Eduardo and Santos (2014) point out that 
each organisation has its own characteristics that lead to particular information 
security needs. The Brazilian standard that is identical to international ISO/IEC 27002 
expressed the same understanding by proposing that organisations need to conduct 
a risk analysis and assessment to identify vulnerabilities, threats, the probability of 
occurrence, and potential impact, allowing them to select which measures are 
necessary to their own reality. However, the adoption of information security measures 
may not be the result of strategic decisions by an Information Security Governance 
structure.  Adoption may be a result of the regulation by the Government and other 
agencies responsible for its importance for IT managers and professionals because 
these measures are recommended by international standards widely adopted. 
 
They are associated with a training and certification market that may lead 
organisations to hire consulting services, professionals and managers with a 
homogeneous understanding about information security measure’s needs. Also, 
measures adopted by leading organisations in academia or public sector may be 
imitated by public sector and public research institutes because of uncertainties about 
Information Security risks to which they are exposed (Albuquerque-Junior & Santos, 
2014). Therefore, these organisations may adopt measures that do not meet the 
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needs identified after a risk analysis, but that are responses to external forces to which 
they are subject. 
 
Goodbody (2003:22) identified the security measures that can be applied for the 
protection of security information against files containing sensitive information are 
stored in lockable steel filing cabinets; unauthorised access, alteration, disclosure, or 
destruction ensure that: 
 
 The business premises that house the personal information of employees is 
controlled by cards and it requires passwords to access the information.  
 The only relevant official has access to the secure store that holds files with 
sensitive information.  
 Officials need passwords to access electronic files. 
 There is a security measure in place to ensure that personal information is 
accidentally disclosed to the public, and that included areas where computer 
screens are located, showrooms and waiting rooms. 
 The officials have been well developed on issues of security and protection of 
sensitive information and the consequences of non-compliance.   
 
The authorities are granted powers to draw up an information handling policy, which 
is brought to the attention of all employees responsible for handling personal 
information. The policy should indicate the consequences of not adhering to the set 
policies. The policies should be in line with the Constitution of South Africa. 
 
Kam, Katerattanakul, Gogolin, and Hong (2013) note that external pressures influence 
Information Security in academic organisations and that this influence may be 
understood from the perspective of institutional theory approach suggested by Bjorck 
(2004). As information is an extremely important asset for public research institutes 
and as the protection of information is a necessity or even an obligation, and in the 
characteristics of these organisations. 
 
Govendor (2012: v) asserts that the departments need people who have the expertise 
in information security system so that correct judgments can be made and the 
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operations can be effectively and efficiently executed. The departments’ assets can 
be negatively affected if the threats and vulnerabilities are effectively managed, and 
the SRCM must have information on these incidents.  
 
This study explores security measures, which are designed to enable the government 
departments to counter against the threats and vulnerabilities that they are facing. It 
shows the importance of active management on the issues of security and the 
importance of bringing the most appropriate security measures. Consequently, the 
study shows that relationship between the policymaking, implementation of relevant 
security measures, analysing the effectiveness of the security measures and the 
maintenance of security measures.   
 
3.3 INTERNATIONAL BEST PRACTICES ON PROTECTION OF SECURITY 
INFORMATION 
 
The government departments are using information and communication technologies 
as part of their information system and it is expected that every department should 
have security measures. The management must not only focus on developing the best 
policies without having methods or programmes to ensure that they are implemented.  
It is important that the employees are well aware of its existence so that the practices 
are standard.  The researcher managed to collect and analyse information regarding 
the international best practices on control and handling of classified information. The 
section also covers the levels of classification. 
 
The relationship between security objectives and practices are complicated but 
important to understand (Dhillon & Backhouse, 2001). In addition, Byrnes and Procter 
(2002) concur with Dhillon and Backhouse (2001) that some practices only contribute 
to a particular security objective. Therefore, it is important for security managers to 
have the expertise to allocate appropriate resources to countermeasure and diagnose 
the threat. This would indicate the impact that management practices has on the 
protection of government information.  To understand how the management has an 
influence on the objective of information security it is important to explore the 
interrelationships between security objectives and the management practices.   
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Ma and Pearson (2005) indicate that the implementation of information security 
initiatives needs more research. The departments must understand the foundational 
structure of their security system by identifying the inter-relationships among security 
practices. The departments do not share the same challenges and priorities when 
comes to the implementation of security practices. In this way, Ma and Pearson (2005) 
assert that they are of the same view with Dhillon & Backhouse (2001) that the 
department can effectively implement the information security practices if the security 
practitioners associate them with the security objectives. However, other external 
influences have an influence on the success of security practices implementation. Ma 
and Pearson (2005) further point out the issue of senior management endorsement, 
financial availabilities, departments’ policies and the organisational culture of the 
department. 
 
Barlette (2006) identified remedies to the departments when implementing information 
security practices. The process must have a hierarchy influence; computerization, 
ethical codes, support to the users, and constant security awareness. Barlette (2006) 
maintains that the key factor in the implementation of information security practices is 
the support and commitment of senior management. The management’s involvement 
would have a positive influence and affect the success of the implementation.   
 
Ma and Pearson (2005) opined that the consequence results from the management 
who do not want to comply with the security practices of the departments. The 
management’s involvement in the protection of information is very important. Stoll and 
Breu (2012:261) concur with Ma and Pearson (2005) that policy development is the 
point of departure if the departments want to implement the best practice in information 
security. The department must consult with their regulatory requirements, corporate 
with their partner departments, and establish the security policy. The departments that 
have a clear vision and operational policy produce strategic practices and objectives.   
 
Ma and Pearson (2005) further indicate that the Information Security Policy must 
clearly specify the responsibilities of the employees on Information Security, and 
illustrate the importance of security to the departments.  The department must appoint 
managers who are responsible for updating and maintaining the security policies and 
support the information security programmes. They alluded that the next phase 
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involves organisational security, which includes the authorisation of the Information 
Security Management Committee. The Committee is responsible for advising the 
department and business units on Information Security Management. 
 
Stoll and Breu (2012:261) recommend that the departments must conduct a risk 
assessment to establish a risk treatment plan to reduce the security risk to an 
acceptable level of risk. For the identified remaining risk, a department’s continuity 
plan is developed, implemented, maintained, tested, and updated regularly. The 
authors added that the department’s process objectives are assumed from the 
corporate objectives by regarding the specific business, contractual, legal, and 
regulatory requirements for the single process. The authors further analyse and 
optimise all business processes in a strategically aligned way. In that, the 
stakeholder’s requirements together with information security are improved. The 
information security measures and controls, identified in the risk assessment and 
business continuity planning, are suitably integrated into the operational processes. 
 
Stefanek (2002:68) argues that Control Access Information is a government 
designation for computer security that requires computers to have the ability to control 
access to the computer via usernames and passwords, and protect files by assigning 
ownership and access rights. Stefanek (2002: 68) recommends the desktop operating 
systems to have at least the Control Access Information compliance that ensures the 
safety of individual’s information. These security features would ensure the aggressors 
do not physically access the information on individual’s computers systems.  
 
The California Polytechnic State University (CAL POL) (2018) concurs with Stefanek 
(2002:68) that the use of a strong password is important to control access to the 
computer system. They further opined that most officials reuse the passwords on their 
computer system, whilst others use the same password for everything. The reusing of 
one password for more than one computer, account, website, or other secure systems, 
will be only as secure as the least secure systems. The aggressor would be able to 
unlock all the security systems with one password, and this includes the officials who 
never change their password.   
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CAL POL (2018) is of the view that the officials must back up their important 
information and ensure that it can be restored when needed.  They must avoid using 
storing information on inaccessible devices; this can be caused by virus infection, 
hardware failure, and other causes. The officials must protect their personal and 
employer’s information by ensuring that their system is updated and the information is 
backed-up regularly. California Polytechnic State University (2018) further indicates 
that the officials must take full control of their official emails, by not responding to 
emails that require personal information. The must be alert at all times and avoid 
suspicious links or unknown messages from banks, competition vouchers or fake 
websites that want the confirmation of identity or account number. All government 
officials must be security conscious.   
 
The development and maintenance of the system that stores classified information is 
an important factor of information security as indicated by Ma and Pearson (2005). 
The classification control must clearly be labelled based on the level of confidentiality, 
clearly classified with a simple, effective system, and be recorded based on ownership. 
The departments Information Computer Technology (ICT) Business Units must have 
a formal procedure to maintain the security of application software. The confidentiality, 
authenticity, and the integrity of information must be protected by means of 
cryptographic techniques. They must protect system files by controlling program 
source libraries in the development process to system development and maintenance. 
They should be formal procedures to maintain the security of application software. 
 
Merkow and Breithaupt (2014) indicate that some of the preserved confidentiality, 
integrity and/or availability are granting access only to authorized personnel, applying 
encryption to information that will be sent over the internet or stored on digital media. 
Therefore, the government department should implement the periodically testing 
system security to uncover new vulnerabilities, building software defensively, and 
developing a disaster recovery plan to ensure that the business can continue to exist 
in the event of a disaster or loss access by personnel. Talbot and Jakeman (2008:32) 
agree with Merkow and Breithaupt (2014), and the researcher concurs, that the 
information of vulnerabilities should be emphasised in specific security control 
measures, projected through people assets, information assets, physical information 
and communication technology. 
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Fomin, de Vries and Barlette (2008) focus on a different theory in protection of 
classified information, but within the Information Computer Technology Business Unit 
in departments. Barlette and Fomin (2009) identified many theories and models 
developed in order to understand employee’s behaviour in the ICT field. They 
classified them within three main families and that includes behavioural theories, 
technology and computer acceptance theories, and theories linked to psychology, 
morals and ethics. The authors suggest that the intentions come from attitude towards 
behaviour, and subjective norms and intention lead to behaviour. 
 
The study explored the interrelationship between the government departments’ 
security objectives, security policies and management practices. It respond to the 
questions on how the departments’ information security objectives are influenced by 
the interaction of the policies and management practices. It also identifies which 
practices contribute to which information security objectives of the department. The 
study indicates how much each of the management practices contributes to the total 
security goal of the department. 
 
3.4 SECURITY CONTROLS AND HANDLING STANDARD FOR 
CLASSIFICATIONS 
 
In order to strengthen security controls and handling standards for classifying 
information, stringent modes of control are vital especially in an environment where 
there is sensitive information (Linder & Carter 2017). Rules govern how such 
information is stored, handled and transmitted. Classified information is typically stored 
in safes, vaults, or vault-type rooms. Specific features required for storage facilities 
are governed by the classification level and category of documents to be stored. 
Storage of Controlled Unclassified Information is much less rigorous, but storage in 
locked cabinets and rooms is usually required. Restrictions on where and how 
sensitive material can be handled are tied to level of sensitivity and handling can be 
limited to sensitive Compartmentalised Information Facilities to Limited Areas, or to 
Property Protection Areas. 
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In addition, storage and handling of sensitive computer files are under analogous 
restrictions, and computer networks at various levels of security are used as 
appropriate. Various networks are carefully isolated from each other, including by 
electronic isolation and by control of movement of recordable media. Access to such 
networks is also tightly controlled. Information protection hygiene requires that prior to 
review, documents in preparation be controlled and handled at the highest level of 
protection likely to be needed. The transmission of sensitive information is similarly 
regulated according to level and category, with requirements ranging from 
transmission via secure networks or channels down to use of encryption to move 
certain Controlled Unclassified Information on open networks (ibid). 
 
CAL POL (2018) reports that applying a classification label to each piece of 
information, an important part of information classification involves identifying the 
security controls that can consistently be applied to each level. For purposes of this 
research, strict provision is available by regulation and law that the departments shall 
establish the appropriate technical and organisational controls to prevent the 
unauthorised or unlawful processing or disclosure or information.  The departments 
shall ensure that the security controls in terms of physical security such as control 
access to buildings or rooms correctly handle and dispose of printed material 
containing personal information. The departments shall control the administration 
processes by restricting access based on role or authority and restrict password. They 
must also use technical controls such as storing personal information on a secure 
server; make use of privacy enhancing technologies.  The technical controls are 
appropriate for the information being processed and maintained: 
 
 Information security controls need to be implemented commensurate with 
information value, sensitivity and risk. Information in each classification level will 
require varying security controls appropriate to the degree to which the loss or 
corruption of the data would be harmful to individuals, impair the business or 
academic functions at department, result in financial loss, or violate law, policy or 
the department’s contracts. 
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 Information security controls need to include, but not be limited to, an appropriate 
combination of the following: Physical Access Control, Administrative Access 
Control, and Technical Access Control. 
 The Information Authority and the Information Security Officers collectively will 
determine the appropriate information security controls required for each 
classification level. 
 
As stated in the MISS document (1998), all organisations have at their disposal 
information that is to some extent sensitive in nature and obviously requires security 
measures. The degree of sensitively determines the level of protection, which implies 
that information must be graded or classified according to it. Every classification 
necessitates certain security measures with respect to the protection of sensitive 
information, which will be known as classified information. 
 
The MISS (South Africa, 1998) alludes that the responsibility for the grading and 
regarding or of document classifications rest with the institution where the documents 
have their origin. This function rests with the author of the classified document or head 
of the institution or his delegates.  The classifications assigned to documents shall be 
strictly observed and may not be changed without the consent of the institution or his 
delegate. Where applicable, the author of a classified document shall indicate thereon 
whether it may be reclassified after a certain period or upon the occurrence of a 
particular event. This option is to be applied consistently upon the award of a 
classification higher than restricted. Should the author of a document on which there 
is no embargo to reclassify such document, he must inform all addressees of the new 
classification. The MISS (South Africa, 1998) further stipulates that the receiver of a 
classified document who is of the opinion that the document concerned must be 
reclassified must obtain oral or written authorisation from the author, the head of the 
institution or his delegates. Such authorisation must be indicated on the relevant 
document when it is reclassified. 
 
The classification, document, or file will be determined by the highest graded 
information it contains. The same classification as that of the original must be assigned 
to extracts from classified documents, unless the author consents to a lower 
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classification. Every document must be classified on its own merit and in accordance 
with the origin of its contents, and not in accordance with its connection with or 
reference to some other classified document. However, the mere existence of a 
document referred to is in itself information that calls for a higher security classification 
that the document must be classified accordingly. The author of document must guard 
against the under classification, over-classification or unnecessary classification of 
documents. The head of an institution or her delegate must on a regular basis test 
classifications of documents generated in her institution against the criteria applicable 
to the relevant classification. 
 
All incoming classified documents, including official, classified post marked “Personal” 
must be received and noted in a register by persons with the appropriate clearance. 
The object of such registration is to enable total control over such documents. This 
provision does not apply to document bearing a restricted classification. The officials 
who usually receive the incoming post of an institution must hand the unopened inner 
envelope of incoming classified correspondence to the appropriate officials who are 
authorised to open correspondences in a certain category. The letters are responsible 
for entering the correspondence concerned in the prescribed register (South Africa, 
1998). 
 
The MISS Cabinet document (South Africa, 1998) states that the departments must 
ensure formal control by recoding all classified information that is distributed within the 
department and the information that is sent out of the department. The departments  
must have security systems in place to ensure that procedures are followed when 
classified information is dispatched to another department, and informal exchange of 
information must be avoided. Some departments have control measures to manage 
the registration of incoming and outgoing classified postal materials, and they are 
labelled according to their level of classifications. This provision can be applied to all 
government documents, not only on restricted material.   
 
The registers must include the following particulars:  
 The Particulars of incoming post: serial number of the entry; date of receipt; from 
whom received; registered postal material and reference number; Classification; 
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Subject/heading; Disposal: File number, Recipient signature; further dispatch and 
destruction.   
 Particulars of the outgoing post: serial number of the entry; date of dispatch; 
reference number and date of the document; Classification; subject / heading; 
dispatch / addressing to; nature of dispatch; the registered number of postal 
material; signature of the recipient; receipt number; the date when the receipt was 
obtained. 
 
The security controls include the standards and the policies that must be adhered to 
when working with sensitive information that is deemed classified. In addition, the 
study discusses the socio-cultural measures that support technical security methods 
so that the information security becomes a natural aspect in the daily activity of every 
government employee. The study further discusses the protection of personal 
information and the legislation and policies that guide the employee's government. 
 
3.5 THE LEVELS OF CLASSIFICATION 
 
The CAL POL  (2018) has identified three classification levels that are referred to as 
Level 1, Level 2 and Level 3. Although all the enumerated information values require 
some level of protection, particular data values are considered more sensitive and 
correspondingly tighter controls are required for these values. All the government 
information should be reviewed on a periodic basis and classified according to its use, 
sensitivity and importance. The level of security will depend in part on the effect that 
unauthorised access or disclosure of those data values would have on the operations, 
functions, image or reputation, assets, or the privacy of individuals.  
 
This information requires a substantial degree of protection, as a compromise of the 
information could cause serious damage to the State, the government, commercial 
entities or members of the public is the one that is viewed as carrying the highest risk. 
The information requires a high level of confidence in the identity of the individual 
accessing the information. For instance, compromise could threaten life directly, 
seriously prejudice public order and substantially damage government finances or 
economic and commercial interests (Latham, 2014:7).  
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San Jose State University (SJSU) (2015) is of the same view with CAL POLY (2018), 
when it comes to the level of classification. Both institutions have categorised their 
information classification in Confidential, Internal Use Only and Public Available. They 
both recommend the confidential information shall be limited in distribution to those 
with an established business need-to-know. They indicated that the information should 
be kept to a minimum, and should be accessed from its original source and copies or 
printed versions.   
 
The information may be classified as confidential based on criteria including the severe 
risk such as the information whose unauthorised use, access, disclosure, acquisition, 
modification, loss or deletion could result in severe damage to the department. SJSU 
(2015) avers that confidential information can cause the most serious harm to 
individuals and the department because of unauthorised access to information 
intended solely for use within the department, its auxiliary employees, contractors, and 
vendors covered by a confidentially-security agreement and limited to those with a 
business “need-to-know”. 
 
Chapter 2 of the MISS Cabinet document (South Africa, 1998) differs from CAL POLY 
(2018) and SJSU (2015) when it comes to levels of classification. It indicates all 
government department must have security measures in place and sensitive official 
material must be classified as restricted, secret or top-secret. The system would 
prescribe with information requires protection and classification. It would also give 
guidance regarding the documents that must be downgraded or upgraded. The 
departments must adhere to the policy requirements to maintain the same standard of 
classification. The documents must be classified in accordance with the level of 
protection warranted by the contents and nature of the documents.  
 
The MISS Cabinet document (South Africa, 1998) indicates that in South Africa, the 
most severe level of classification is top-secret. The MISS (South Africa, 1998) 
stipulates that the Top-Secret classification be given to information that contains 
material that can neutralize the vision and mission of the departments and the national 
security. If this information can be infiltrated, the outcome thereof can lead to the 
declaration of war and damage the diplomatic relations between States. It can affect 
the inspirations of socio-economic development of the country, and encourage conflict 
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over collaborations and encourage a civil war. The departments must ensure such 
information can only be circulated between officials who are directly involved in the 
operations and have undergone the vetting process to determine their level of security 
competency. Top-secret information is managed from the executive level and by highly 
trained intelligence officials.  This requires tested officials with integrity and loyalty to 
the Republic (South Africa, 1998). 
 
SJSU (2015) and CAL POLY (2018) share another view on a level two classification, 
which is meant for Internal Use Only. The two institutions described the second level 
as moderate risk. The sensitivity of information that is classified as internal use only 
may include information protected owing to proprietary, privacy concern, ethical, and 
contractual. The limited use of this information may be intended solely for use within 
the department and the employees can only have access to relevant information that 
would assist them to execute their functions. A need-to-know principle would be 
applied to service providers. 
 
The MISS Cabinet document (South Africa, 1998) further differs from CAL POLY 
(2018) and SJSU (2015), in terms of the level of classification. The second level of 
classification in South Africa is Secret. This is information that contains information 
that could have a direct impact on the planning, policy development and functions of 
the departments. It this information is compromised, the departments would face 
difficulties to efficiently and effectively execute its mandate, and that would affect the 
operational relations between departments. It would further have a negative 
impression on the State, and weaken the diplomatic relations between the affected 
government and interested countries. Because of the seriousness of Secret 
Information, people’s life can also be endangered (South Africa, 1998). 
 
Latham (2014:6) describes the second high-risk level of classification as Protected. 
The classification label differs but the description of risk is similar to that of the MISS 
Cabinet Document of South Africa (South Africa, 1998). This is information that could 
cause damage to the reputation of the State, departments, and the country’s 
international relations with other countries. If this information is comprised, it would 
affect the country’s economic and political growth by creating uncertainties in the 
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business community and foreign investors. In democratic countries, this can also affect 
the confidence public and result in violence.  
 
The MISS Cabinet document (South Africa, 1998) uses the term confidential as a low-
risk classification in compare to SJSU (2015) and CAL POLY (2018). In South Africa, 
if the information is capable of being utilised by aggressors to hurt the mandate of the 
departments and the Republic, it is classified as Confidential. This is information that 
has the substance to frustrate or interrupts the normal proceedings of the departments. 
It can also damage the personal and professional reputation of individuals; the formal 
administrations of the department, and have a negative effect on operational 
relationships between government departments. Compromising such information may 
have financial implications on the departments or its personnel, but it can be overcome 
(South Africa, 1998). 
 
SJSU (2015) and CAL POLY (2018) further present the level three of classification as 
Publicly Available. It is information intended to be publicly available or provided to the 
public. If this information were leaked, it would not have financial implications to the 
department, diminish reputation, or jeopardise the security of information data. The 
MISS (South Africa, 1998) does not have the classification that encourages public 
participation. Its lowest risk classification is Restricted, which is the information that 
could inconvenience the government department’s operations and effect its personnel. 
The disclosure of such information would not damage the reputation of the State and 
its officials, however, if restricted information can be compromised, it would affect daily 
operations of the departments. South Africa depends on PAIA to accommodate the 
public participation. 
 
Latham (2014:4) concurs with SJSU (2015) and CAL POLY (2018) with the Public 
classification level that allows the public access to information with the authority of the 
custodian. Latham (ibid) further indicates that the integrity of public information needs 
to be maintained and protected by the agencies charged with the responsibilities of 
national security. The information must be restricted with none-public security 
classification until the public is authorised to access such information. There are 
requirement or assurances that reveals the identities of people who have an interest 
in viewing the information.   
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The Protection of Information Bill (2010) indicates that if the State is of the opinion that 
the information they have is likely to cause demonstrable harm to the security of the 
government and the department if disclosed to unauthorised people, they may classify 
the information as Confidential. It adds that if the State believes that the sensitivity of 
the information is capable of causing serious demonstrable harm to the national 
security of the RSA if disclosed, the State may classify the information or material as 
Secret. The Bill further provides the State with the provision to classify the information 
as a Top Secret, if they reasonably believe that the sensitivity of the information could 
demonstrably cause serious damage to the Republic and further damage the 
government’s diplomatic relations with other countries. 
 
HESA (2014) highlights the concern on the classification regime provided by the Bill, 
and describe the criteria of classification as unclear. The Bill does not specify or give 
direction on what material requires classification and to what level of extent, and it 
further leaves the classification to the discretion of the classifying official. HESA (2014) 
questions the accuracy and objective when making a distinction between what 
information and material that is regarded as demonstrable harmful, serious 
demonstrable or irreparable harm to State security. This questions how the Bill 
justifying the classification of information into a top secret, secret or confidential.  
  
Olsen (2010:89) recommends the following levels of classification for protection of the 
information:  
 Classified: It refers to a highly sensitive information that is prohibited from sharing 
with anyone who is not who is not authorized or is part of the mission. Such 
information requires high protective measures.  
  Confidential: It refers to information that is restricted for officials who are directly 
working with such information. The officials, who are not part of such operations, 
cannot be allowed to access information.   
 Sensitive: It refers to information that is shared with the employees and is not 
allowed to be disclosed to outsiders. Such information is sensitive but it is 
communicated to a larger scale of the department.   
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 Unrestricted: it refers to information that has little consequence to the department 
or its personnel. Such information can be shared with the members of the public.  
 
The study shows that countries and institutions differ when coming to information 
classification and the value of that information. It highlights that different countries and 
institutions approach the protection of classified information in accordance with the 
use, sensitivity, and importance. The study discusses the level of classification and 
the harm that cause if it is handed to the aggressors. The study further shows the 
seriousness attached to the classification of government information. 
 
3.6 PERSONNEL SECURITY VETTING 
 
Molapo (2017) indicates that the security screening investigation commonly known as 
Security Vetting was introduced in government departments with the objective of 
ensuring that all the individuals employed in government with access to classified 
information. The process is meant to ensure that the employees possess qualities that 
will enable them not to disclose the government’s classified information to the hands 
of the aggressors, and compromise the security of the State. In addition, the 
government departments carry the operational mandate, which includes vetting 
administration and fieldwork investigation. The SSA carries the legal mandate, which 
includes the polygraph examination, evaluation and the decision whether to issue or 
deny. Molapo (2017) argues that regardless of the devolution of the operations of 
vetting by the SSA, the departments are still experiencing challenges with the current 
vetting approach. 
 
The MISS document (South Africa, 1998) defines the security vetting as a methodical 
process to determine the person’s security competency when placed in positions that 
have access to sensitive information. The position that the person is applying for or 
occupying, determines the level of security clearance. The vetting process ensures 
that the officials do not occupy the government’s position with misrepresented 
academic qualifications and criminal records. This gives direction to the department 
on how officials that carries the security clearance can be utilised. The hiring 
department must issue the declaration of secrecy forms to the application as part of 
the employment process, and this should be included in all government positions. The 
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President of the RSA is the only one who can give authority to conduct the vetting 
investigation on the political appointees, such as the Director-General and the 
Ambassadors. All officials from the highest rank of Deputy Director-General to lowest 
ranked officials that have access to government information must undergo the vetting 
process.   
 
The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) Security 
Sector Reform Working Group (2006) alludes there are similarities and differences in 
how countries approach their vetting process. For the department to commence with 
the vetting process, the applicant must submit the disclosure form. The form requires 
the applicants to disclose their full particulars, including their prior names, current and 
previous residential address, financial information, overseas trips and information on 
legal convictions. Furthermore, the disclosure forms require applicants to disclose any 
conflict of interest, misrepresentation of the information that they have provided or 
intentionally omitting the information. In addition, the applicant in made aware that 
misleading the vetting process could constitute grounds for a negative outcome such 
as dismissal or not be employed by the screening department. 
 
Molapo (2017:11) concurs with DCAF (2006) that vetting practice is not the same 
around the world. Every State has their own methods of vetting that is more suitable 
for them. This refers only to the process and not the contents itself because the 
objective is to conduct background checks. Maizland (2017) concurs with Molapo 
(2017:11) when arguing the vetting investigation test more different things through the 
background checks. The investigators examine all factors that carry weight, such as 
allegiance to foreign countries, foreign influence, and financial background. They 
follow the concept of the “Whole Person” approach, which requires them to look at all 
the information together and determine whether the person is acceptable. It is 
designed to get a sense of an individual’s veracity, whether one is truthful with the 
government departments and whether or not there are areas of vulnerability that could 
lead to the exploitation by a foreign power. The Vetting Investigators are tasked to 
determine the likelihood that the individual could leak sensitive information to the 
public or to a foreign government and whether the individual might be susceptible to 
blackmail and to get a good understanding of the person’s overall character. 
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DCAF (2006) highlights that institutions such as Human Rights and Governance have 
expressed their dissatisfaction on how the vetting investigation is invading the privacy 
of the officials. The vetting process is an intelligence-driven investigation that 
systematically searches the private lives of the officials. The officials are required to 
apply for a security clearance and give approval to the vetting unit to conduct their 
background check investigation. The only government official officials whose consent 
may not be required are military conscripts.  Another challenge that the vetting process 
is facing, is the vetting units and the vetting officers who abuse their powers. The 
influence that the vetting officers have over the personal lives and the careers of the 
officials who are vetted is huge. The vetting officers undergo a regular intensive vetting 
process and they are reinvestigated to prevent them from abusing the authority that 
has been installed in their positions. The process further covers the lifestyle audit of 
vetting officers, to prevent them from participating in corruption activities.    
 
Herman (2017) alludes that the then Minister of State Security, Advocate Bongo 
agreed with Fraser, by pointing out the issue of accountability when comes to 
conducting vetting of senior government officials. Herman (2017) reports that the SSA 
and Parliament’s Joint Standing Committee on intelligence is in the process of 
introducing new regulations that would enforce compliance and that will include 
sanctions. Herman (2017) further indicated that the then Head of SSA, Arthur Fraser 
refused to give the details of the draft, but assured the Parliament that it would address 
the issue of none-compliance. 
 
3.7 SECURITY CLEARANCE 
 
Homeland Security (2005) shares the same view with the MISS (South Africa, 1998) 
that the sanctity of the classification programme is dependent upon the suitability, 
integrity, trustworthiness, and reliability of the persons to whom access to classified 
information is granted. The MISS (1998) opines that a security clearance does not 
give official rights to all classified information, but it gives direction on how an official 
can be utilised. As such, prior to being granted access to classified information, each 
person would go through the vetting process and polygraph examination, and the SSA 
would formally issue the security clearance to those persons deemed worthy of such 
trust.   
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Maizland (2017) concurs with Homeland Security (2005) that the levels of security 
clearances must correspond to the level of sensitivity of information the individual 
needs to access for their job. The levels of security clearance include Confidential, 
Secret, and Top Secret clearance. However, having a security clearance does not 
mean that the officials can get an access to the entire department’s classified 
information or attend to all classified meetings. Each department strategically 
approaches their operations different and sensitive information is shared on the need-
to-know basis.   
 
Serrao (2017) concurs with the MISS (South Africa, 1998) that the level of clearance 
must correspond with the level of sensitivity of information that the individual needs to 
access for their jobs. The officials get access to classified information and subjected 
to need-to-know principles based on their level of security clearance. Serrao (2017) 
maintains that senior SAPS Crime Intelligence officials are operating without security 
clearances, and they get access to highly classified information on a daily basis. Most 
of these senior officials have never been through the vetting process and some are 
operating with expired security clearances.   
 
Enochs (2016) further notes that the security clearances are not granted to people; 
they are attached to the people’s occupations. At government departments, human 
resources officials determine the responsibilities attached to the occupation and the 
level of sensitive information that the official will access. The officials would then be 
vetted on an appropriate security classification.   
 
The MISS document (South Africa, 1998) indicates that the heads of the departments 
must ensure that the correct processes are followed and the officials comply with the 
security policies of the departments. The accounting officer must ensure that the 
officials are vetted, and those in a position of top secret and secret clearances are re-
vetted every five years.  The officials in a position of confidential clearances are re-
vetted every ten years; however, the vetting unit would liaise with the authorized 
supervisor every five years. In the case where the supervisor discover new 
vulnerabilities or an official has been moved to a more sensitive environment, the 
vetting unit may conduct re-vetting before the security clearance of the official laps.     
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The MISS document (1998) shares the same view with Enochs (2016) that a security 
clearance issued in respect of officers while they are attached to particular institutions. 
The MISS document (1998) further alludes when the government officials move to 
another department; it is the responsibility of the receiving department to determine 
whether to recognise the existing security clearance or conduct another vetting of the 
official. However, security clearance can be transferable, for the purpose of 
operational function and meetings. It is the responsibility of the new employer to report 
the details of the security clearance to the chairperson of that meeting in writing, and 
that includes the level of clearance and the validities.   
 
3.8 SUMMARY 
 
The chapter presented the discussion of the current vetting processes and its 
challenges. The chapter also highlighted similarities and differences on how countries 
approach the vetting process. It highlights that the security clearance is attached to 
the people’s occupations and the sensitivity of the information they access on their 
positions. It also explains that the security clearance is just an indication of how an 
official can be utilised by the deparment, and the officials get access to classified 
information and subjected to need-to-know principles based on their level of security 
clearance. The discussion in this chapter also shows that the South African 
government departments are responsible for vetting fieldwork investigations of their 
own personnel, but they do not have the legal mandate to issue or deny security 
clearances. The SSA carries the legal mandate to issue, downgrade, deny, and handle 
the appeal process. 
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CHAPTER 4  
SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The research was conducted because of the high volume of classified information that 
is leaked by government department officials, whether internationally or nationally. The 
officials get access to sensitive information and critical systems that have the ability to 
harm the RSA, the department, its personnel, and its resources. The research also 
shows that the departments do not maintain uniformity with respect to the classification 
system. Therefore, the security breaches of government classified information 
remains a national threat.   
 
4.2 SUMMARY 
 
The research was conducted to explore the chasm in the protection of classified 
information in South African government departments. This was conducted in order to 
gain knowledge of the content and to reach the objective of the research.  In the first 
chapter, researcher set the objectives of the study and the methodology that he used 
to achieve them. The researcher covered the legal framework and the Acts, which 
direct the protection of information in South Africa in Chapter 2. The researcher 
presented current information protection regime and the legal mandate, the principal 
changes in the working draft of the new protection of Information Act, and the need for 
new information protection mechanism. In Chapter 3, the researcher described the 
existing SRCM used for the protection of security information in government 
departments. He further determines the local and international best practices on the 
protection of security information, which dealt with aspects of information 
classification, security controls and handling standard for classifications. Chapter 3 
also covered security clearance and vetting. The final chapter draws together the 
research objectives, the research findings, conclusion, and recommendations 
emerged from the study. These recommendations focus on aspects deduced from 
content analysis.   
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 4.3 FINDINGS 
 
The researcher formulated findings, to address the objectives of the research. The  
research findings are based on the objectives of the study. Based on findings, the 
recommendations will be made. 
 
4.3.1 Objective 1:To examine the South African legal mandate on protection of 
security information in the government institutions 
 
The study revealed that the lack of quality in the application of classification and 
declassification process, it is a consequence of a lack of a comprehensive statutory 
framework in the protection of classified information. That has destabilised the 
government agencies that are tasked with the responsibility to manage classified 
information, and it has a direct negative impact on the departments. The current 
methods of protection of information reflect the mechanism that was used by the 
apartheid State, which encourage the government to unnecessary classify the 
massive amounts of information. The departments are experiencing the backlogs and 
the pressure to handle a massive amount of classified information. They also lack 
clarity on what information requires protection and how to declassify State Information.  
 
4.3.2 Objective 2: To describe  the existing security risk control measures used 
for the protection of security information in government departments 
 
The findings allude that the government departments have evaluated their SRCM; it 
was found that the technical measures are not as effective as the awareness 
programmes. The outcome of these assessments also indicates that the departments 
are not implementing the recommended organisational information security measures. 
These have resulted in excessive costs because the methods that have been found 
to be more effective and efficient to the organisational information security are not 
implemented.   
 
The researcher found that the departments have spent a lot of money on security 
applications that are not working or are wrongly implemented; however, it is difficult to 
hold someone accountable for wasteful expenditure. It was found that the 
57 
department’s adoption of information security measures is a result of the 
management’s strategic decisions guarded by an Information Security Governance 
structure. The department has identified measures to deal with cybersecurity concerns 
but they do not have a common policy framework and the implementation strategy. 
 
4.3.3 Objective 3: To determine the local and international best practices on 
protection of security information 
 
The findings indicate that the departments do not have the suitable technical and 
organisational controls to prevent the unauthorised or unlawful processing or 
disclosure of personal information. It was found that the departments have information 
that is to some extent sensitive in nature at their disposal but they are not sure who is 
responsible for grading of document classifications. 
 
The researcher found that the people’s personal information is processed without the 
departments’ permission. It was found that the officials who are dealing with classified 
information in the departments do not have valid security clearance and some did not 
go through the vetting process. 
 
The study revealed that the officials make mistakes when marking classified 
information. The safes that are used to store information do not meet the requirements 
to secure sensitive information, and the electronic records are secured on 
unprescribed networks.  The departments allow officials access to all sensitive 
information because they have appropriate clearance or other qualifications. The 
Departments are struggling to establish the Need-to-Know Principle to control the 
access to specific sensitive information.   
 
4.4 RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Hofstee (2006:159) asserts that recommendations are called suggestions for the 
application of research and must be feasible to implement and clearly useful. Based 
on the findings of this study, the following recommendations can be made: 
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4.4.1 The need to examine the South African legal mandate on protection of 
security information in the government institutions 
 
From the findings, it is recommended that the government must finalise the approval 
of Protection of Information Bill, to stabilise the classification and declassification of 
information mechanism. The departments need a comprehensive statutory framework 
that would give provision on how the department must manage the State classified 
information. This will create an environment that is clear on what is expected from 
them and it would have a positive impact on departments’ security policy 
developments. The statutory framework would provide direction on what information 
needs to be protected and that subsequently reduce the unnecessary massive amount 
of information that the government department process. It would ensure the South 
African Constitutional values are adhered to and provide an effective and efficient 
protection of classified information.   
 
The current protection of information mechanism is the MISS document (South Africa, 
1998) and the entire government department must adhere to it. This document is 
aimed at providing the necessary procedures and measures to protect the government 
information, its personnel and its resources. The departments should, therefore, 
compile their own rules of procedure to fit their own circumstances and operations. 
 
4.4.2 The value of understanding the existing security risk control measures 
used for the protection of security information in government departments 
 
The recommendation that emanates from the findings is that the departments should 
implement the proper security measures that are both administrative and technically 
effective. The newly developed technologies have presented the government with new 
threats that need urgent development of security policies and strategies that equal the 
nature of these threats. 
 
The departments should conduct a regular risk control assessment that would help 
them to find the specific threats and the people who are possibly involved in this 
problems, this would allow them to select measures that are necessary to their own 
reliability. The risk analysis would improve the relationship between the department’s 
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security policies; information security measures the effectiveness of the organisational 
information security measures. 
 
The departments should further implement the security measurement programme that 
can enable them to check progress in their attempt to protect the information that the 
State is producing, and whether the State Security Agency is achieving its mandate. 
The implementations of these security measurements would give clear indication on 
whether the departments are complying with the Constitution of the Republic, relevant 
Legislations and standard working procedures. The adoption of security measures by 
the departments must be a result of the regulation by the government and other 
agencies responsible of its importance for IT managers and professionals because 
these measures are in compliance to international standards. 
 
Another recommendation that emanates from the findings is that the department must 
develop a strategy, which directly deals with Cyber Security. The departments, SSA, 
Special Investigations Unit and the State IT Agency must jointly develop a common 
vulnerability assessment methodology for the public service.  
 
The departments must identify the need for a common policy on information security 
across the public service. They must use the International Standard Operational 
Standard on information security aimed at ensuring the protection of government and 
citizen information by safeguarding its confidentiality, integrity and availability.     
 
The government departments should not use the security measures to cover up 
maladministration, misrepresentation, corruption, or to protect officials involved in 
criminal activities. The security measures must be in the best interest of the 
department and the RSA.  
 
4.4.3 The importance of aligning national best practices on the protection of 
security information to international best practices 
 
Another recommendation that emanates from the findings is that the departments shall 
control the administration processes by restricting access based on role or authority 
and restrict passwords. They must also have technical controls such as storing 
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personal information on a secure server and make use of privacy enhancing 
technologies. They must ensure that the technical controls are appropriate for the 
information being processed and maintained. 
 
The departments must have security measures with respect to the protection of 
sensitive information. The responsibility for the grading of document classifications 
rests with the author or head of the department where the documents have their origin. 
The classifications assigned to documents shall be strictly observed and may not be 
changed without the consent of the institution or delegate. 
 
It is recommended that all officials processing personal information on behalf of an 
employer must have the necessary authorisation from the employer to do so. Such an 
official must have a written contract with their employer in which they are specifically 
obliged to maintain the integrity and confidentiality of the personal and to implement 
the established safeguards against identified risks. 
 
Another previous recommendation is that all government officials must undergo the 
vetting process and be graded according to the level of information that they get 
access to. It is also recommended that officials who deal with highly classified 
information should be reviewed on an annual basis to ensure that the access to this 
much information is still needed. 
 
There is a wide set of rule and restrictions that must adhere to when controlling 
sensitive information, and the officials must respect the procedures. It is recommended 
that engineering controls and operational procedures must be adhered to in order to 
minimise mistakes. The officials must utilise the electronic monitor to provide layer of 
verification, and physically inspect the safes and ensure that the government 
information is properly secured.  
 
The last recommendation to be made is that the departments must establish a Need-
to-Know requirement and formal processes to manage those who possess sensitive 
information. The approval from the authorised officials would be required to ensure 
that the officials who are in positive of classified information satisfy the requirements.  
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It is further recommended that those who are authorised to manage sensitive 
information must ensure that the functions of the officials require them to access such 
information and they are qualified.  
 
The SSA and government departments must meet regularly to discuss the threats and 
vulnerabilities within national, provincial and local government.  The SSA, as the 
custodian of protection of government of information, should clear the confusion by 
setting the standard that would ensure that all department manages the classification 
system the same.   
 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
 
The research was conducted to explore the chasm in the protection of classified 
information within South African government departments. This was conducted in 
order to gain knowledge of the content and to reach the objective of the research.  
Based on the findings of the study, it can be concluded that the government 
departments are not familiar with the complex nature of protection of classified 
information. The study also observed that the absence of a comprehensive statutory 
framework has resulted in an unstable and inconsistent classification and 
declassification environment. In the context of security vetting, the study shows that 
the departments are not adhering to the basic things such as security policies and the 
standard working procedures, and that constitute security risk.  The security controls 
in the government departments are either implemented incorrectly or are ineffective.  
The recommendations in this study are equivalent to international standards and they 
can help South African government departments to secure the classified information.  
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